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INSURING LANDSLIDES: AMERICA’S  
UNINSURED NATURAL CATASTROPHES 
Christopher C. French* 
Landslides occur in all fifty states and cause approximately $3.5 billion in 
property damage annually. Yet, in America, “all risk” homeowners and commer-
cial property insurance policies exclude coverage for landslides, and there is only 
limited availability of expensive, stand-alone “named peril” insurance policies 
that cover landslide losses. Consequently, the affected homeowners are often left 
financially devastated—homeless with a mortgage to pay on an unsaleable piece 
of property. 
This Article analyzes the problem of insuring landslide losses in America 
and proposes ways to help solve it. It describes both historical and recent land-
slide events. It discusses the insurance industry’s response to the problem of in-
suring landslides, including the theoretical justifications insurers historically 
have used to successfully exclude coverage for landslides—adverse selection, 
moral hazard and correlated risks. It also considers how other countries such as 
Belgium, France, New Zealand, Norway, Romania, Switzerland, Iceland and 
Australia address the issue of insuring landslide losses. It concludes by offering 
two ways to transform the insurance market for landslide losses in America. 
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INTRODUCTION 
At 10:37 a.m., a few miles east of Oso, a town near Seattle, Washington, a 
woman heard a roar that sounded like an airplane crash.1 A mountain of mud 
twenty feet high was “racing like 150 miles an hour [sic] across the far end of 
the valley.”2 She had time to exclaim, “Oh my God,” before the wall of mud 
destroyed her house.3 Somehow she survived and dug her way out of the “tan-
gled sludge.”4 More than forty people perished.5 In all, the landslide was nearly 
one mile wide and engulfed forty-nine homes and businesses.6 The clean-up 
costs and damage have been estimated at more than $40 million.7 The Oso 
Landslide is the second-deadliest natural disaster in the history of the State of 
1  Mike Lindblom & Mike Carter, Survivor Tells of Loud Crack, Wall of Mud, House in 
‘Sticks’, SEATTLE TIMES (Mar. 22, 2014, 8:11 PM), http://old.seattletimes.com/ht 
ml/localnews/2023202905_mudslidevictimsxml.html [https://perma.cc/J8WU-ZLVU]; Eliz-
abeth Weise & Elizabeth Wiley, Oso Landslide Hit Fast, Hard and with No Warning, USA
TODAY (Mar. 30, 2014, 10:29 PM), http://www.usatoday.com/story/news/nation/2014/03/ 
28/oso-landslide-seismic-records-two-slides-no-warning/7019249/ [https://perma.cc/U7YQ-
TD9A]. 
2  Weise & Wiley, supra note 1. 
3  Id. 
4  Lindsey Bever, The Fatal Mudslide in Washington: What Was It Like?, WASH. POST (Mar. 
24, 2014), https://www.washingtonpost.com/news/morning-mix/wp/2014/03/24/the-fatal- 
mudslide-in-washington-what-was-it-like/ [https://perma.cc/W3EW-59SP]. 
5  See Media Update, Snohomish Cty. Med. Exam’rs Office (May 27, 2014, 7:30 AM), 
http://snohomishcountywa.gov/ArchiveCenter/ViewFile/Item/3855 [https://perma.cc/D24D-
QG28]. 
6  Seattle Times Staff, 14 Dead; 176 Reports of People Missing in Mile-Wide Mudslide, 
SEATTLE TIMES (Mar. 24, 2014, 11:36 AM), http://old.seattletimes.com/ht 
ml/localnews/2023215066_mudslidemondayxml.html?mbaseid=2023215066 [https://perma. 
cc/XCV4-3P8F]. 
7  Oso Mudslide: Washington State Disaster Site Yields More Dead, BBC NEWS (Apr. 2, 
2014) [hereinafter BBC NEWS], http://www.bbc.com/news/world-us-canada-26855649 [http 
s://perma.cc/49WL-M53S]. 
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Washington.8 Not one of the homes and businesses had insurance that covered 
landslides.9  
Landslides occur in all fifty states and cause approximately $3.5 billion in 
property damage per year.10 They occur regularly in the coastal and mountain-
ous areas of California, Oregon, and Washington, the intermountain central 
western states, and the mountainous and hilly regions of the eastern United 
States.11 
How is it possible that not a single home or business destroyed by the Oso 
Landslide had insurance that covers landslide losses? Like several other types 
of natural catastrophes such as floods and earthquakes, landslides are excluded 
from coverage under “all risk” homeowners and “all risk” commercial-property 
insurance policies.12 Not only are landslides specifically excluded from cover-
age under “all risk” property policies, insurance that covers landslides is not 
even available for purchase in many states.13 
Why are landslides, one of the biggest and most expensive disasters that 
can impact a person’s home or business, excluded from coverage under “all 
risk” property policies? Insurers have advanced three principal theoretical bases 
to justify excluding coverage for natural catastrophes: (1) adverse selection, (2) 
moral hazard, and (3) correlated risks.14 The theory of adverse selection is that 
8  Austin Jenkins, Oso Landslide Could Be Deadliest Disaster in Washington State History, 
NW NEWS NETWORK (Mar. 27, 2014), http://nwnewsnetwork.org/post/oso-landslide-could-
be-deadliest-disaster-washington-state-history [https://perma.cc/7MTU-EVM7]. 
9  Caitlin Bronson, “Absolutely Heartbreaking” Lack of Coverage for Wash. Landslide Vic-
tims, INS. BUS. AM. (Mar. 26, 2014), http://www.ibamag.com/news/catastrophe/absolutely-
heartbreaking-lack-of-coverage-for-wash--landslide-victims-17666.aspx [https://perma.cc/Q 
XJ9-73FX]. 
10  U.S. GEOLOGICAL SURVEY, LANDSLIDE TYPES AND PROCESSES (2004); Rob Risley, Com-
ment, Landslide Peril and Homeowners’ Insurance in California, 40 UCLA L. REV. 1145, 
1146–47 (1993); Landslides in the United States Since 2007, NAT’L GEOGRAPHIC (Apr. 23, 
2014), http://news.nationalgeographic.com/news/2014/04/140422-surveying-american-land 
slides-interactive/ [https://perma.cc/9U68-QLNK]. 
11  U.S. GEOLOGICAL SURVEY, supra note 10; Don Hopey, The Pittsburgh Area Is Prone to 
Landslides, and Human Activity Often Makes Them Worse Down Town, POST-GAZETTE.COM 
(Aug. 6, 2001), http://old.post-gazette.com/healthscience/20010806landslidemainhealth 
6p6.asp [https://perma.cc/K3ZN-XH2G] (the Pittsburgh area has more than 15,000 docu-
mented landslides). 
12  See, e.g., Brian Mattis, Earth Movement Claims Under All Risk Insurance: The Rules 
Have Changed in California, 31 SANTA CLARA L. REV. 29, 36 (1990) (citing State Farm Fire 
& Cas. Co.’s Homeowners Policy Special Form 3, p. 7, Form FP-7103); Ins. Servs. Office, 
Inc., Causes of Loss – Broad Form No. CP 10 20 06 07, at 2 (2007). “All risk” property in-
surance covers all risks of loss unless the peril is specifically excluded. See PETER J. KALIS
ET AL., POLICYHOLDER’S GUIDE TO THE LAW OF INSURANCE COVERAGE § 13.02[B] (Supp. 
2015). 
13  See infra Parts II.A and II.D. 
14  See, e.g., Christopher C. French, Insuring Floods: The Most Common and Devastating 
Natural Catastrophes in America, 60 VILL. L. REV. 53, 54 (2015). 
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only the people most likely to have losses will purchase insurance.15 Moral-
hazard theory posits knowledge that insurance will cover any losses makes a 
person who has insurance less likely to take care to avoid losses.16 Correlated 
risks are risks that may result in numerous losses in the same area at approxi-
mately the same time.17 Insurers have claimed that the inability to predict when 
correlated risks will result in losses makes it impossible to set actuarially sound 
premiums.18 
15  Adverse selection is “the disproportionate tendency of those who are more likely to suffer 
losses to seek insurance against those losses.” Kenneth S. Abraham & Lance Liebman, Pri-
vate Insurance, Social Insurance, and Tort Reform: Toward a New Vision of Compensation 
for Illness and Injury, 93 COLUM. L. REV. 75, 102 n.82 (1993); see Tom Baker, Containing 
the Promise of Insurance: Adverse Selection and Risk Classification, 9 CONN. INS. L.J. 371, 
373–75 (2003). Some critics of the concept of adverse selection have argued that insurers’ 
alleged concerns regarding the impact that adverse selection actually has on policyholders’ 
behavior are overblown. See, e.g., Peter Siegelman, Essay, Adverse Selection in Insurance 
Markets: An Exaggerated Threat, 113 YALE L.J. 1223, 1223 (2004). 
16  Moral hazard is the term used to describe the phenomenon that a person will have a “ten-
dency to take fewer precautions in the presence of insurance.” Adam F. Scales, The Chicken 
and the Egg: Kenneth S. Abraham’s “The Liability Century,” 94 VA. L. REV. 1259, 1263 
(2008) (book review). Judge Easterbrook has described the theory underlying the concept by 
stating that “[o]nce a person has insurance, he will take more risks than before because he 
bears less of the cost of his conduct.” W. Cas. & Sur. Co. v. W. World Ins. Co., 769 F.2d 
381, 385 (7th Cir. 1985). The term “moral hazard” also generally encompasses situations 
where “[a] person . . . deliberately causes a loss . . . [or] exaggerates the size of a claim to 
defraud an insurer.” MARK S. DORFMAN, INTRODUCTION TO RISK MANAGEMENT AND 
INSURANCE 480 (8th ed. 2005). Numerous scholars have written articles regarding moral 
hazard and offered similar descriptions of the concept. See, e.g., Scott E. Harrington, Prices 
and Profits in the Liability Insurance Market, in FOUNDATIONS OF INSURANCE ECONOMICS:
READINGS IN ECONOMICS AND FINANCE LIABILITY: PERSPECTIVES AND POLICY 626, 631 
(George Dionne & Scott Harrington eds., 1992) (“Moral hazard is the tendency for the pres-
ence and characteristics of insurance coverage to produce inefficient changes in buyers’ loss 
prevention activities, including carelessness and fraud . . .”); ROBERT H. JERRY, II &
DOUGLAS R. RICHMOND, UNDERSTANDING INSURANCE LAW 12 (5th ed. 2012) (“[T]he exist-
ence of insurance can have the perverse effect of increasing the probability of loss. . . . [t]his 
phenomenon is called moral hazard.”); George L. Priest, The Current Insurance Crisis and 
Modern Tort Law, 96 YALE L.J. 1521, 1547 (1987) (“Moral hazard refers to the effect of the 
existence of insurance itself on the level of insurance claims made by the insured. . . . Ex 
ante moral hazard is the reduction in precautions taken by the insured to prevent the loss, 
because of the existence of insurance.”); Gary T. Schwartz, The Ethics and the Economics of 
Tort Liability Insurance, 75 CORNELL L. REV. 313, 338 n.117 (1990) (“ ‘Moral hazard’ is 
sometimes distinguished from ‘morale hazard,’ the former referring to deliberate acts like 
arson, the latter to the mere relaxation of the defendant’s discipline of carefulness.”). 
17  Correlated risks are situations where numerous people in concentrated areas have essen-
tially the same risk of the same type of loss occurring at approximately the same time. 
French, supra note 14, at 63; see also Véronique Bruggeman et al., Insurance Against Catas-
trophe: Government Stimulation of Insurance Markets for Catastrophic Events, 23 DUKE
ENVTL. L. & POL’Y F. 185, 187 (2012); J. David Cummins, Should the Government Provide 
Insurance for Catastrophes?, FED. RES. BANK ST. LOUIS REV., July 2006, at 342–43; Adam 
F. Scales, A Nation of Policyholders: Governmental and Market Failure in Flood Insurance,
26 MISS. C. L. REV. 3, 10–11 (2006).
18  See Bruggeman et al., supra note 17. 
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When a risk simultaneously involves adverse selection, moral hazard, and 
correlated risks, conventional wisdom says the risk is one that insurers cannot 
or should not cover. Landslides are such a risk, according to this conventional 
wisdom. First, only the people most likely to suffer landslide losses will pur-
chase a policy that covers only landslides. Thus, the pool of insured persons 
(“insureds”) that would pay premiums to cover landslide losses would be rela-
tively small, and the premiums would need to be very high, frustrating the risk-
spreading function of insurance. Second, under moral hazard theory, a home-
owner who has insurance would take fewer measures to avoid or minimize 
landslide losses, thereby increasing the likelihood and severity of landslide 
losses. Third, landslide losses are correlated risks because the losses associated 
with landslide events tend to occur in concentrated geographic locations at 
about the same time.  
This Article questions the soundness of the three justifications for exclud-
ing coverage for landslide losses under “all risk” property policies. Once the 
limited force of these justifications is recognized, two solutions to the problem 
become apparent: simply eliminate the exclusion from homeowners’ policies, 
or establish state-sponsored landslide insurance programs.  
Today, homeowners insurance is a classic example of a type of insurance 
for which adverse selection is of little concern because the pool of insureds 
across which the risk of loss is spread is so large. Because homeowners insur-
ance is effectively mandatory in America, approximately 95 percent of home-
owners buy homeowners insurance.19 One cannot get a federally guaranteed 
mortgage without homeowners insurance.20 Consequently, if landslide losses 
were covered by homeowners insurance, then the pool of insureds across which 
the risk of loss would be spread would be so enormous that adverse selection 
regarding the purchase of insurance to cover landslide losses would not be an 
issue. 
Similarly, moral-hazard concerns regarding landslide losses are actually 
quite low because of the extreme danger landslides present and the enormous 
disruption and inconvenience a landslide causes a homeowner. In addition to 
the risk of bodily injury or death, a homeowner can lose items of irreplaceable 
sentimental value when a landslide hits and the homeowner often becomes 
homeless. Thus, people have ample incentives to avoid landslide losses regard-
less of whether they have insurance. Consequently, it stands to reason that 
building codes and land development restrictions are a better means of avoiding 
19  INS. INFO. INST., HOMEOWNERS AND RENTERS INSURANCE, http://www.iii.org/facts_statis 
tics/homeowners-and-renters-insurance.html [https://perma.cc/72MF-P9BY] (last visited 
May 31, 2016); see also Scales, supra note 17, at 18. 
20  See What is Homeowner’s Insurance? Why is Homeowner’s Insurance Required?, 
CONSUMER FIN. PROT. BUREAU [hereinafter CONSUMER FIN. PROT. BUREAU], 
http://www.consumerfinance.gov/askcfpb/162/what-is-homeowners-insurance-why-is-home 
owners-insurance-required.html [https://perma.cc/C3UX-EGBG] (last visited July 5, 2016). 
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or preventing landslide losses than excluding coverage for landslides under “all 
risk” property policies is. 
Also, landslides are not correlated risks like earthquakes and floods, which 
can impact hundreds or thousands of people in the same geographic area at ap-
proximately the same time.21 Notwithstanding the exceptional size of the Oso 
Landslide, most landslides are geographically isolated events that impact only a 
few people when they occur.22 
In addition, unlike when landslide losses are insured under stand-alone pol-
icies, the financial risks to insurers associated with covering landslide losses 
would be reduced, if not entirely eliminated, if they were covered under “all 
risk” homeowners policies. That is because the capital reserves from which in-
surers would pay losses would be created from a pool of capital created by the 
approximately sixty-nine million premium-paying homeowners23 whose prop-
erties are located throughout the country rather than from just the few thousand 
people who currently buy stand-alone landslide insurance and primarily live in 
areas at a high risk for landslides.  
In addition, due to the growth of global reinsurance and the sale of catas-
trophe bonds during the past few decades,24 the financial risk to any individual 
insurer from a landslide event can be further reduced. With such risk-
transferring mechanisms, other insurers and investors can share an individual 
insurer’s risk of loss.  
This Article proceeds in three parts. Part I describes the nature and history 
of landslides. Part II discusses the landslide exclusion and the theoretical ra-
tionales used to justify insurers’ refusal to cover landslides. Part III discusses 
the arguments in favor of and against eliminating the landslide exclusion cur-
rently contained in “all risk” property policies. Part III also examines how other 
countries such as Belgium, France, New Zealand, Norway, Romania, Switzer-
21  Correlated Risks, WORLD FINANCE (June 30, 2010) http://www.worldfinance.com/ 
home/risk-encyclopaedia/correlated-risks [https://perma.cc/CQ3D-865A]. 
22  See, e.g., LANDSLIDES: EVALUATION AND STABILIZATION 126 (Willy A. Lacerda et al. eds., 
2005) (stating over 500 landslides studied between 1954 and 2001 had an average size of 
just over 500 square meters); LAWRENCE R. WALKER & AARON B. SHIELS, LANDSLIDE
ECOLOGY 62 (2013) (stating the average size of 281 landslides studied was 100 square me-
ters); Risley, supra note 10, at 1174 (“Although relative earthquake risk among homeowners 
will vary with construction and soil type, earthquake peril threatens nearly every California 
homeowner. . . . Landslide risk is more site-specific than earthquake risk . . .”). To contrast 
landslides with correlated risks, consider that the Oso Landslide, one of the worst landslides 
in American history, caused approximately $42 million in damages while Hurricane Katrina 
caused over $100 billion. See Christine A. Klein & Sandra B. Zellmer, Mississippi River Sto-
ries: Lessons from a Century of Unnatural Disasters, 60 SMU L. REV. 1471, 1499 (2007); 
BBC NEWS, supra note 7. 
23  See French, supra note 14, at 75. 
24  See generally Al Yoon & Leslie Scism, Investors Embrace ‘Catastrophe Bonds’, WALL
ST. J. (Apr. 23, 2014, 6:44 PM), http://www.wsj.com/articles/SB1000142405270230404990 
4579517710350913016 [https://perma.cc/TVS8-4AGR]. 
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land, Iceland, and Australia have addressed the issue of insuring landslide loss-
es. This article concludes that the elimination of the landslide exclusion from 
homeowners policies would increase the number of American homeowners 
with coverage for landslide losses from a few thousand to sixty-nine million 
without causing undue financial hardship to insurers. Another more expensive, 
but potentially satisfactory, way of addressing the problem would be through 
the creation of state-sponsored landslide insurance programs. Under both pro-
posals, the current problem of uninsured landslide losses in America would be 
addressed. 
I. THE NATURE AND HISTORY OF LANDSLIDES IN AMERICA
A. The Nature of Landslides
The term “landslide” denotes a “wide variety of processes that result in the
downward and outward movement of slope-forming materials including rock, 
soil, artificial fill, or a combination of these” materials.25 Although landslides 
are primarily associated with mountainous regions, they also occur on slopes 
that are not particularly steep in cases of river bluff failures, collapses of coal 
mine-waste piles, and roadway and building excavations.26 Landslides include 
“falls” (abrupt movements of masses such as rocks and boulders), earth slides, 
debris flows, and earthen avalanches such as “mudslides.”27 
Landslides result from a variety of causes, including earthquakes, volcanic 
activity, and human activities such as excavation or deforestation, but slope 
saturation by water is usually the primary cause.28 Typically, natural landslides 
occur after periods of intense rainfall or snowmelt.29 The upper layers of soil 
become unstable due to the weight of the water in the soil.30 The downward 
pull of gravity causes the upper, saturated soil to slip away from the more sta-
ble underlying material.31 It is often difficult to predict precisely when and 
where landslides will occur, which means there is often little or no advance 
warning to the people in the areas where landslides occur.32 The Oso Landslide 
is a deadly example. 
25  See U.S. GEOLOGICAL SURVEY, supra note 10. 
26  Id. 
27  Id. 
28  Id. 
29  Id. 
30  Id. 
31  Id. 
32  See, e.g., William Yardley, Water Views with a Hint of Daring and Danger, N.Y. TIMES, 
Feb. 27, 2012, at A11. 
70 NEVADA LAW JOURNAL [Vol. 17:63 
B. The Prevalence of Landslides
Landslides are not a new problem in America. They are natural phenomena
that have occurred for eons, but they are especially damaging and dangerous 
for areas of the country on or near hillsides and mountains that have been de-
veloped.33 The area in and around Pittsburgh, Pennsylvania, for example, has 
had over 15,000 documented landslides.34 Oregon has over 46,000 known land-
slide locations.35 In Washington, landslide debris has covered the entire twenty-
mile stretch of railroad track between Everett and Elliott Bay in Seattle at one 
time or another over the past eighty years, with one hundred landslides occur-
ring along the route in 2011 alone.36 California, which accounts for approxi-
mately 20 percent of the landslides in America, also has a long history of land-
slide disasters, causing billions of dollars of damage and numerous deaths.37  
A map that shows the landslide risk profiles for the various areas of the 
country is set forth below with the darkest areas depicting the areas with the 
highest risk:38 
 As discussed above, nearly all of the annual $3.5 billion landslide-damage 
loss in the United States is uninsured.39 Often, homes are not repaired, and 
many victims are rendered homeless while facing the prospect of bankruptcy 
33  See U.S. GEOLOGICAL SURVEY, supra note 10. 
34  See Hopey, supra note 11. 
35  Tim Steele, Landslide Database Now Includes 46,000+ Locations, KOIN 6 (Apr. 23, 2014, 
6:07 PM), http://koin.com/2014/04/23/landslide-database-now-includes-46000-locations/ [ht 
tps://perma.cc/CMZ5-ENPW]. 
36  Yardley, supra note 32. 
37  See, e.g., Samuel Goldberg, Comment, Falling into the Pacific: California Landslides and 
Land Use Controls, 16 S. CAL. REV. L. & SOC. JUST. 95, 105–06, 112 (2006); Risley, supra 
note 10, at 1147. 
38  U.S. GEOLOGICAL SURVEY, Landslide Overview Map of the Conterminous United States, 
NAT’L CTR. ENVTL. INFO., http://www.ngdc.noaa.gov/hazardimages/picture/show/1546 [http 
s://perma.cc/S6J9-CYJV] (last visited May 31, 2016). 
39  Supra Introduction. 
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because they remain legally liable for their damaged houses as well as the 
mortgages.40 
II. INSURERS’ EXCLUSION OF COVERAGE FOR LANDSLIDES
A. The Landslide Exclusion
Most homeowners policies purport to cover “all risks” of loss except for
the specific risks that are expressly excluded.41 Historically, prior to the advent 
of “all risk” property policies, property policies were “named peril” policies 
that covered only one specified peril.42 Following the Great Fire of 1666 in 
London, the first non-marine named-peril policy was created to cover fire loss-
es.43 Beginning in the 1940s and 1950s, insurers began bundling together cov-
erages for multiple named perils into single policies.44 Such policies are known 
as “multi-peril” policies.45 As with named peril policies, any perils that were 
not expressly listed as covered under “multi-peril” policies were excluded.46 
“All risk” policies evolved from “multi-peril” policies and provide the broadest 
property coverage available.47
For hundreds of years, coverage for the risk of loss due to “earth move-
ment,” which includes earthquakes and landslides, generally has been excluded 
from coverage under the various types of property policies.48 The landslide ex-
40  See Sanjay Bhatt, Slide Erased Their Homes, but Maybe Not Their Loans, SEATTLE TIMES
(Apr. 1, 2014, 9:29 PM), 
http://seattletimes.com/html/latestnews/2023278858_mudslidefinancialxml.html 
[https://perma.cc/XR8Z-546R] (“If [the Oso Landslide victims] can’t get adequate relief on 
their mortgages, . . . they may pursue bankruptcy to get rid of the debt.”); Becky Johnson, 
Landslide Hazard Maps Axed by State: Risky Slopes in Jackson, Haywood to Remain a Mys-
tery for Now, SMOKY MOUNTAIN NEWS (June 29, 2011, 7:25 PM), http://www.smokymoun 
tainnews.com/news/item/4292-landslide-hazard-maps-axed-by-state-risky-slopes-in-jackson-
haywood-to-remain-a-mystery-for-now [https://perma.cc/9ZHT-CUJX] (“Regular home-
owners insurance doesn’t cover landslides. Homeowners are out of luck—whether a home is 
totally flattened or the foundation destabilized due to shifting soil. They can’t sell their 
home, nor will insurance compensate them. Meanwhile, they have to keep paying the mort-
gage on a house they can’t live in. Often, bankruptcy and foreclosure become the only op-
tion.”). 
41  See, e.g., Jeff Katofsky, Subsiding Away: Can California Homeowners Recover from 
Their Insurer for Subsidence Damages to Their Homes?, 20 PAC. L.J. 783, 785 (1989) (“In 
an ‘all risk’ policy, all losses except those specifically excluded are covered. This is the 
broadest form of coverage and has been so interpreted by the courts.”). 
42  See KALIS ET AL., supra note 12, § 13.02[A][1]. 
43  Id. 
44  French, supra note 14, at 60. 
45  See id. 
46  Id.; KALIS ET AL., supra note 12, § 13.02[A]. 
47  KALIS ET AL., supra note 12, § 13.02[B]. 
48  See, e.g., Columbia Ins. Co. of Alexandria v. Lawrence, 35 U.S. 507, 518 (1836) (noting 
the exclusion of coverage for earthquakes under a fire policy); Peters Twp. Sch. Dist. v. 
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clusion currently contained in “all risk” homeowners policies is worded the 
same as or similar to the following: “We do not insure for loss caused directly 
or indirectly by . . . Earth Movement [, which] means . . . landslide, mudslide or 
mudflow . . .”49 “All risk” commercial-property policies currently contain a 
similarly worded exclusion for losses caused by landslides: 
We will not pay for loss or damage caused directly or indirectly by any of the 
following. . . . [l]andslide, including any earth sinking, rising or shifting related 
to such event; . . . Such loss or damage is excluded regardless of any other cause 
or event that contributes concurrently or in any sequence to the loss.50 
Hartford Accident & Indem. Co., 833 F.2d 32, 35 (3rd Cir. 1987) (“[T]he reason for the in-
sertion of the exclusionary clause . . . in all risk insurance policies is to relieve the insurer 
from occasional major disasters which are almost impossible to predict and thus to insure 
against. There are earthquakes or floods which cause a major catastrophe and wreak damage 
to everyone in a large area rather than on individual policyholder.”) (quoting Wyatt v. Nw. 
Mut. Ins. Co., 304 F. Supp. 781, 782–83 (D. Minn. 1969)); Powell v. Liberty Mut. Fire Ins. 
Co., 252 P.3d 668, 672–73 (Nev. 2011) (“Earth movement exclusions were historically in-
cluded in insurance policies to protect insurance companies from having to pay out on poli-
cies when a catastrophic event caused damage to numerous policyholders.”); Christopher C. 
French, The “Ensuing Loss” Clause in Insurance Policies: The Forgotten and Misunder-
stood Antidote to Anti-Concurrent Causation Exclusions, 13 NEV. L.J. 215, 216–17 (2012). 
49  INS. SERVS. OFFICE, INC., SAMPLE HOMEOWNERS POLICY FORM NO. HO 00 03 05 11, at 12 
(2010), reprinted in KENNETH S. ABRAHAM & DANIEL SCHWARCZ, INSURANCE LAW AND 
REGULATION 197 (6th ed. 2015) (emphasis added). The complete wording of a typical “earth 
movement” exclusion is as follows: 
A. We do not insure for loss caused directly or indirectly by . . .
2. Earth Movement [, which] means:
a. Earthquake, including land shock waves or tremors before, during or after a volcanic eruption;
b. Landslide, mudslide or mudflow;
c. Subsidence or sinkhole; or
d. Any other earth movement including earth sinking, rising or shifting.
This Exclusion A.2 applies regardless of whether any of the above, in A.2.a through A.2.d, is
caused by an act of nature or is otherwise caused.
However, direct loss by fire, explosion or theft resulting from any of the above, in A.2.a through
A.2.d, is covered. 
Id. Interestingly, insurers added the “ensuing loss” language to the exclusion as a result of 
adverse court rulings in California regarding the “earth movement” exclusion in which the 
courts required insurers to cover the losses caused by fires that in turn were caused by the 
1906 San Francisco earthquake. See French, supra note 48. 
50  INS. SERVS. OFFICE, INC., CAUSES OF LOSS – SPECIAL FORM, COMMERCIAL PROPERTY FORM
CP 10 30 10 12 § B.1.b.2., at 1 (2011) (emphasis added). Insurance Services Office (“ISO”) 
is an influential organization within the insurance industry comprised of approximately 1400 
property and casualty insurers that promulgates standard form insurance policies, including 
property policies. Hartford Fire Ins. Co. v. California, 509 U.S. 764, 772 (1993). In particu-
lar, the organization develops its own standard policy forms and makes them available to its 
member insurers which then adopt them and present them to state insurance regulators for 
approval. See, e.g., id. The complete wording of the “earth movement” exclusion contained 
in typical “all risk” property policies is as follows: 
B. Exclusions
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“All risk” property policies that contain landslide exclusions are contracts 
of adhesion drafted by insurers and then sold on a take-it-or-leave-it basis.51 
Because “all risk” homeowners policies sold in America generally contain 
landslide exclusions, homeowners generally cannot buy an “all risk” home-
owners policy that does not contain an exclusion for landslides.52  
1. We will not pay for loss or damage caused directly or indirectly by any of the following. Such
loss or damage is excluded regardless of any other cause or event that contributes concurrently
or in any sequence to the loss.
b. Earth Movement
(1) Earthquake, including tremors and aftershocks and any earth sinking, rising or shifting relat-
ed to such event;
(2) Landslide, including any earth sinking, rising or shifting related to such event;
(3) Mine subsidence, meaning subsidence of a man-made mine, whether or not mining activity
has ceased;
(4) Earth sinking (other than sinkhole collapse), rising or shifting including soil conditions
which cause settling, cracking or other disarrangement of foundations or other parts of realty.
Soil conditions include contraction, expansion, freezing, thawing, erosion, improperly compact-
ed soil and the action of water under the ground surface. 
But if Earth Movement, as described in b (1) through (4) above, results in fire or explosion, we
will pay for the loss or damage caused by that fire or explosion. 
(5) Volcanic eruption, explosion or effusion. But if volcanic eruption, explosion or effusion re-
sults in fire, building glass breakage or Volcanic Action, we will pay for the loss or damage
caused by the fire, building glass breakage or Volcanic Action.
INS. SERVS. OFFICE, INC., CAUSES OF LOSS – SPECIAL FORM, COMMERCIAL PROPERTY FORM
CP 10 30 10 12 § B.1., at 1 (2011). 
51  See, e.g., JEFFREY W. STEMPEL, LAW OF INSURANCE CONTRACT DISPUTES § 4.06[b], at 4–
37 (2d ed. Supp. 2005) (“In a sense, the typical insurance contract is one of ‘super-adhesion’ 
in that the contract is completely standardized and not even reviewed prior to contract for-
mation.”); Michelle Boardman, Insuring Understanding: The Tested Language Defense, 95 
IOWA L. REV. 1075, 1091 (2010) (describing the “hyperstandardization” of insurance poli-
cies); James M. Fischer, Why Are Insurance Contracts Subject to Special Rules of Interpre-
tation?: Text Versus Context, 24 ARIZ. ST. L.J. 995, 996 (1992) (“The only part of the stand-
ard policy that is generally customized to the consumer-insured is the Declarations Sheet . . . 
[T]here is little, if any, freedom to negotiate the standardized language of the insurance con-
tract that determines the scope of coverage.”); Susan Randall, Freedom of Contract in Insur-
ance, 14 CONN. INS. L.J. 107, 125 (2008) (“[I]n some lines of insurance, all insurance com-
panies provide identical coverage on the same take-it-or-leave-it basis.”); Kent D. Syverud,
The Duty to Settle, 76 VA. L. REV. 1113, 1153 (1990) (“[P]roperty owner’s liability insur-
ance contracts are standardized across insurers in a form few insureds have the power or ex-
perience to bargain around.”).
52  Contrary to a common misconception, flood policies sold under the National Flood Insur-
ance Program (“NFIP”) do not cover landslides. See e.g., FEMA, STANDARD FLOOD
INSURANCE POLICY DWELLING FORM F-122 (2015). The only arguably landslide-related cov-
erage provided under NFIP policies is for “mudflow,” which is defined as “[a] river of liquid 
and flowing mud on the surface of normally dry land areas, as when earth is carried by a cur-
rent of water. Other earth movements, such as landslide, slope failure, or a saturated soil 
mass moving by liquidity down a slope, are not mudflows.” Id. § II.18. 
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B. The Adverse Selection, Moral Hazard and Correlated Risk Concerns That
Led to the Landslide Exclusion
Insurers provide three primary reasons for refusing to cover the risk of
losses due to natural catastrophes like landslides: (1) adverse selection, (2) 
moral hazard, and (3) correlated risks.53  
1. Adverse Selection
Adverse-selection theory posits that “a party facing a high risk of loss is 
more likely to seek insurance than a party facing a low risk.”54 The theory is 
premised on the idea that policyholders have an informational advantage over 
insurers, which enables the policyholders to use that informational advantage to 
allow people who know they are bad risks to buy more insurance than people 
who are good risks.55 When an insurance policy covers only a single peril, then 
adverse selection is more likely to occur.56 A person who thinks his house may 
be damaged by a landslide because he lives on or near a hill or mountain is 
more likely to want to purchase landslide insurance than someone who lives on 
flat farmland. 
The risk of adverse selection diminishes, however, if all of the most com-
mon types of risk of loss are bundled together in the same policy. For example, 
if homeowners policies cover all risks of loss including landslides, tornadoes, 
fires, vandalism, and numerous other perils, then a person who lives on or near 
a mountain or a hill and is concerned about landslides will not have a greater 
incentive to purchase the policy than a person who lives on flat farmland and is 
concerned about tornadoes. Thus, if the policyholder wants to or is required to 
have insurance to cover all losses covered under “all risk” policies, then he will 
buy the policy regardless of whether he thinks he needs coverage for all of the 
perils covered by the policy. 
2. Moral Hazard
Moral hazard is a term that originated in insurance law to describe “the risk 
that an insured or insurance beneficiary would deliberately destroy the subject 
matter that was insured in order to obtain payment of an insurance benefit.”57 
Today, the term is also used to encompass the idea that people who have insur-
ance are less likely to take steps to avoid or minimize losses because someone 
53  See, e.g., Warren Kriesel & Craig Landry, Participation in the National Flood Insurance 
Program: An Empirical Analysis for Coastal Properties, 71 J. RISK & INS. 405, 405 (2004); 
Scales, supra note 17, at 8–9. 
54  ABRAHAM & SCHWARCZ, supra note 49, at 6; see also discussion supra note 15. 
55  See Siegelman, supra note 15, at 1247. 
56  See generally ROBERT W. KLEIN, A REGULATOR’S INTRODUCTION TO THE INSURANCE
INDUSTRY 10–11 (2d ed. 2005). 
57  ABRAHAM & SCHWARCZ, supra note 49, at 7. 
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else will pay the losses—in this instance, the insurer.58 One commentator de-
scribed moral hazard as follows: “In the broader and more usual sense in which 
the term is used, moral hazard means the tendency of a policyholder to be less 
careful in avoiding loss because she will be indemnified if the loss occurs.”59 
Although moral hazard is conceptually intuitive and appealing, landslides 
are not a peril for which moral hazard should be a serious concern. The idea 
that someone will not take steps to prevent his house from being bulldozed by a 
mudslide simply because he has insurance ignores the inability to predict when 
and where landslides will occur as a well as the real and significant mortal dan-
ger landslides present to people and their homes. The loss of one’s home is also 
traumatic and inconvenient. For most people, the knowledge that their houses 
may be repaired or replaced does not mean they would risk their lives or be 
willing to become homeless simply because they have insurance.  
Most people also dread the prospect of having to call and screen contrac-
tors to repair their damaged homes or to arrange for people to come to their 
homes to salvage their personal belongings after their home has been con-
demned for being unsafe. In addition, because landslides often occur quickly 
and with little forewarning,60 personal items of intangible and unquantifiable 
value—such as family heirlooms and photos—are lost in landslides. Insurance 
money cannot replace such items. Thus, the premise that people would not 
bother to take measures to avoid landslide damage if they had insurance over-
looks the powerful incentives that even fully insured policyholders have to 
avoid or mitigate landslide disasters.61  
58  See discussion supra note 16. 
59  JEFFREY W. STEMPEL ET AL., PRINCIPLES OF INSURANCE LAW 96 (4th ed. 2011). 
60  Landslides & Debris Flow, READY.GOV, https://www.ready.gov/landslides-debris-flow 
[https://perma.cc/HJN3-99KL] (last visited July 9, 2016). 
61  Homeowner’s insurance policies already address moral hazard concerns through exclu-
sions designed to exclude coverage for losses intentionally caused by the policyholder or the 
result of willful neglect. See INS. SERVS. OFFICE, INC., CAUSES OF LOSS – BROAD FORM NO.
CP 10 20 06 07, at 2–5 (2007). Property policies also address moral hazard by incentivizing 
policyholders by requiring the policyholder to take preventative measures intended to avoid 
or minimize a loss and providing coverage for the costs the policyholder incurs in doing so 
under the “reasonable repairs” and “property protection” provisions of homeowners policies, 
under the “sue and labor” provisions of commercial property policies, and even under NFIP 
policies to a limited extent. See John S. Clark Co. v. United Nat’l Ins. Co., 304 F. Supp. 2d 
758, 766–67 (M.D.N.C. 2004) (“To be covered as reimbursable sue and labor expenses [un-
der a commercial property policy], those expenditures must be made for the benefit of the 
insurer in mitigating or preventing a covered loss.”); SAMPLE HOMEOWNERS POLICY,
ADDITIONAL COVERAGES, § 2.a and Conditions, § C.4 reprinted in ABRAHAM & SCHWARCZ,
supra note 49, at 191, 199 (requiring homeowner to protect damaged property against further 
damage with the insurer agreeing to pay the costs incurred to do so); FEMA, STANDARD
FLOOD INSURANCE POLICY DWELLING FORM F-122, at 3 (2015) (covering up to $1,000 of the 
policyholder’s costs incurred to avoid or minimize losses). 
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3. Correlated Risks
Correlated risks are risks of the same type of loss by numerous people in 
the same geographic area at approximately the same time.62 Insurers generally 
attempt to avoid insuring correlated risks of loss due to actuarial and capitaliza-
tion concerns; they contend they cannot accurately predict the frequency or se-
verity of such losses or collect enough premiums to spread the risk of loss 
across a large enough pool of policyholders to cover the losses when they oc-
cur.63 Correlated-risk concerns are greatest when an insurer sells insurance only 
in a limited geographic area because the pool of policyholders is limited, and 
all of these policyholders are likely to face the same natural hazards at the same 
time. Namely, people who live in the same neighborhood have similar risks of 
loss for floods, earthquakes and tornadoes. Consequently, if an insurer sells 
policies only locally or regionally, correlated-risk concerns regarding natural 
disasters are well founded.  
Unlike other natural disasters such as floods and earthquakes, however, the 
geographic scope and number of people affected by any individual landslide is 
limited.64 Consequently, landslides generally are not correlated risks in the tra-
ditional sense. Although some large landslides, such as the Oso Landslide that 
destroyed forty-nine homes and businesses,65 do have some characteristics of 
correlated risks, landslides generally are not correlated risks. Floods and earth-
quakes are better examples of correlated risks because they almost simultane-
ously impact hundreds or thousands of people in a given geographic area.66  
In addition, even for traditional correlated risks, the potentially devastating 
financial consequences for insurers have dissipated over the past few decades 
as a result of the emergence of global insurance companies.67 Some of these 
global insurers have market capitalizations of tens or hundreds of billions of 
dollars.68 These global insurers sell insurance to policyholders across America 
and throughout the world, collecting large amounts of premiums and spreading 
the risk of loss across enormous pools of insureds with diverse risk profiles. 
Today, reinsurance and catastrophe bonds also play a larger role in further 
spreading an insurer’s risk of loss than they did in past decades.69 Consequent-
62  See discussion supra note 17. 
63  See Bruggeman et al., supra note 17, at 187; Cummins, supra note 17, at 342–43. 
64  See sources cited supra note 22. 
65  Supra Introduction. 
66  See e.g., cases cited supra note 48. 
67  See Yoon & Scism, supra note 24. 
68  Am. Int’l Grp., Inc. (“AIG”), for example, sells insurance in 130 countries around the 
world, had $68.7 billion in revenue in 2013, and has a market capitalization of approximate-
ly $80 billion. See AM. INT’L GRP., INC., 2015 ANNUAL REPORT, http://www.aig.com/con 
tent/dam/aig/america-canada/us/documents/investor-relations/2015-annual-report.pdf 
[https://perma.cc/KFT8-T2CU]. 
69  See Yoon & Scism, supra note 24. 
Fall 2016] INSURING LANDSLIDES 77 
ly, they too have diminished the financial impact of correlated risks on individ-
ual insurers. Reinsurance has become a worldwide business wherein global re-
insurers insure all of or portions of another insurer’s portfolio of business (re-
ferred to as “treaty” reinsurance).70 Insurers also sell catastrophe bonds, which 
are bonds for specific types of catastrophes such as hurricanes and earthquakes, 
to institutional investors.71 Typically, the investors receive interest payments on 
the bonds and the return of their principal at the end of the bond term unless the 
specified catastrophe occurs, in which case the insurer keeps the principal and 
stops making interest payments on the bonds.72 Between 1996 and 2014, insur-
ers issued $51 billion in catastrophe bonds while incurring only $682 million in 
losses for the catastrophes covered by the bonds (only 1.3 percent of the total 
amount issued).73 Thus, with the rise of global insurance companies and of 
global reinsurance and catastrophe bonds, the risk of a landslide loss in Puget 
Sound74 can now be spread to insureds located throughout the State of Wash-
ington and the world.  
The problem of correlated risks is also much greater when perils are in-
sured separately, as opposed to when coverage for numerous perils are bundled 
together under the same policy. If insurance for landslides is sold only as stand-
alone named-peril insurance, then the risk that the pool of insureds will suffer 
landslide losses at the same time would be more correlated because people in 
the same high risk areas would be the ones most likely to purchase landslide 
insurance. If the policies being sold bundled coverage for landslides together 
with other common perils such as tornadoes, fire and theft, then the pool of pol-
icyholders who would purchase such insurance would be much more diverse 
from both geographic and risk profile perspectives. Consequently, although the 
correlation of the risk of landslide losses in any given geographic area would 
not change, the risk that the entire pool of insureds would suffer landslide loss-
es would not be correlated. 
Consider again the example of two policyholders: one who lives on a 
mountain with landslide concerns, and the other who lives on flat farmland 
with tornado concerns. Because coverage for the perils of tornadoes and land-
slides would be bundled together under the same policy, the risk of a landslide 
loss for the two policyholders would not be correlated. Nor would the risk of 
wind damage for the two policyholders be correlated. Thus, bundling together 
coverage for multiple perils into a single policy not only reduces or eliminates 
adverse-selection concerns, but it also decreases correlated risk concerns be-
70  AM. INT’L GRP., INC., supra note 68, at 186, 282. 
71  See Scales, supra note 17, at 46; Yoon & Scism, supra note 24. 
72  Scales, supra note 17, at 46. 
73  Yoon & Scism, supra note 24. 
74  See generally Seattle, WA Landslide Information, U.S. GEOLOGICAL SURVEY – LANDSLIDE
HAZARDS PROGRAM, http://landslides.usgs.gov/state_local/seattle.php [https://perma.cc/6BM 
8-6BRC] (last visited July 10, 2016).
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cause the larger pool of insureds who might purchase such policies likely 
would have more diverse risk profiles. 
C. Courts’ Inconsistent Applications of the Landslide Exclusion
Despite the broad language of the landslide exclusion that is contained in
“all risk” property policies,75 homeowners and business owners often mistaken-
ly believe they are covered for landslide losses. In some jurisdictions, this be-
lief is reinforced by courts’ inconsistent interpretations of the landslide exclu-
sion. 
Because “all risk” homeowners policies are contracts of adhesion that are 
sold on a take-it-or-leave-it basis and contain numerous exclusions,76 courts in 
some jurisdictions have interpreted an older version of the landslide exclusion 
very narrowly to encompass only naturally occurring landslides.77 This is be-
cause the “earth movement” exclusion that encompasses landslides was created 
to address unpredictable, widespread natural catastrophes such as earthquakes, 
as opposed to man-made events that impact only a single or a few policyhold-
ers at a time.78 Other courts have declined to apply the exclusion at times when 
the landslide results from multiple causes and the efficient proximate cause of 
the landslide is a covered peril.79 In reaching such decisions, the courts have 
applied well-established rules of policy interpretation that dictate that exclu-
75  See INS. SERVS. OFFICE, INC., supra note 50. 
76  Randall, supra note 51. 
77  See, e.g., Sentinel Assocs. v. Am. Mfrs. Mut. Ins. Co., 804 F. Supp. 815, 819 (E.D. Va. 
1992), aff’d, 30 F.3d 130 (4th Cir. 1994); Opsal v. United Servs. Auto. Ass’n, 10 Cal. Rptr. 
2d 352, 355 (Cal. Ct. App. 1991); Steele v. Statesman Ins. Co., 607 A.2d 742, 743 (Pa. 
1992); Murray v. State Farm Fire & Cas. Co., 509 S.E.2d 1, 9, n.6 (W. Va. 1998); Robert P. 
Dahlquist, Perspectives on Subsidence Exclusions and the Role of Concurrent Causation in 
Earth Movement Cases, 37 TORT & INS. L.J. 949, 960–62 (2002); Risley, supra note 10, at 
1153–59. As reflected in Part II.A, insurers have responded to such decisions by adding pol-
icy language to specify that they also intend to exclude coverage for landslides caused by 
human activities. 
78  See supra note 48. 
79  See, e.g., CAL. INS. CODE § 530 (West 2016) (“An insurer is liable for a loss of which a 
peril insured against was the proximate cause, although a peril not contemplated by the con-
tract may have been a remote cause of the loss; but he is not liable for a loss of which the 
peril insured against was only a remote cause.”); Garvey v. State Farm Fire & Cas. Co., 770 
P.2d 704, 715 (Cal. 1989) (stating “efficient proximate cause” analysis should be conducted
to determine whether the earth movement exclusion applies if a covered peril was also in-
volved in causing the loss); Safeco Ins. Co. v. Hirschmann, 773 P.2d 413 (Wash. 1989) (ex-
plaining insurers cannot circumvent the “efficient proximate cause” rule by drafting exclu-
sions that would allow a remote cause of loss encompassed by the earth movement to
preclude coverage where the proximate cause of the damage was a covered peril); Murray,
509 S.E.2d at 10 (stating insurers cannot circumvent the “efficient proximate cause” doctrine
through policy language and concluding the earth movement clause is ambiguous as to
whether it applies only to losses resulting from natural, rather than man-made, forces);
Dahlquist, supra note 77, at 963–69; Risley, supra note 10, at 1155–56.
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sions should be interpreted narrowly, and any ambiguities in the policy lan-
guage should be interpreted in favor of coverage.80  
In other jurisdictions, however, the courts have concluded that the “earth 
movement” exclusion unambiguously excludes coverage for the landslide loss 
at issue.81 Thus, although the “earth movement” exclusion expressly purports to 
exclude coverage for landslide losses, whether a homeowner policy will actual-
ly cover a landslide loss depends upon: (1) the law of the jurisdiction where the 
loss occurs; (2) the precise wording of the landslide exclusion at issue; and (3) 
the cause(s) of the landslide.82 This uncertainty regarding the applicability of 
the exclusion undermines one of the principal purposes of contracts—ensuring 
that the parties’ rights and obligations are memorialized in a way that allows 
the parties to understand and predict their future obligations.83 
D. The Limited Availability of Coverage for Landslides Under Stand-Alone
80  See, e.g., Tews Funeral Home, Inc. v. Ohio Cas. Ins. Co., 832 F.2d 1037, 1045 (7th Cir. 
1987) (holding policy excluding acts explicitly covered in prior section of policy construed 
against insurer); Titan Indem. Co. v. Newton, 39 F. Supp. 2d 1336, 1348 (N.D. Ala. 1999) 
(finding coverage even though “[t]he limitations of [the] policy completely swallow up the 
insuring provisions”); Crane v. State Farm Fire & Cas. Co., 485 P.2d 1129, 1130 (Cal. 1971) 
(“Any ambiguity or uncertainty in an insurance policy is to be resolved against the insur-
er.”); Phillips Home Builders, Inc. v. Travelers Ins. Co., 700 A.2d 127, 129 (Del. 1997) (“If 
there is an ambiguity, however, the contract language is ‘construed most strongly against the 
insurance company that drafted it.’ ”); RPM Pizza, Inc. v. Auto. Cas. Ins. Co., 601 So. 2d 
1366, 1369 (La. 1992) (“[A]ny ambiguity must be construed against the insurance company 
and in favor of the reasonable construction that affords coverage.”); Bailer v. Erie Ins. Exch., 
687 A.2d 1375, 1380 (Md. 1997) (finding “[i]f the exclusion totally swallows the insuring 
provision,” then such provisions create the greatest form of ambiguity, and the insurer is 
obliged to provide coverage); Am. Bumper & Mfg. Co. v. Hartford Fire Ins. Co., 550 
N.W.2d 475, 480 (Mich. 1996) (“[I]n construing insurance contracts, any ambiguities are 
strictly construed against the insurer to maximize coverage.”); Gomolka v. State Auto. Mut. 
Ins. Co., 436 N.E.2d 1347, 1348−49 (Ohio 1982) (quoting Butche v. Ohio Cas. Ins. Co., 187 
N.E.2d 20, 22 (1962)) (“Policies of insurance, which are in language selected by the insurer 
and which are reasonably open to different interpretations, will be construed most favorably 
for the insured.”). 
81  See, e.g., Stankova v. Metro. Prop. & Cas. Ins. Co., No. CIV. 12-8016-PCT-PGR, 2012 
WL 5032564, at *4 (D. Ariz. Oct. 18, 2012); York v. Liberty Mut. Grp., Inc., No. 09-113-
HA, 2010 WL 275653, at *4 (D. Or. Jan. 15, 2010); Olmstead v. Lumbermens Mut. Ins. Co., 
259 N.E.2d 123, 127 (Ohio 1970). 
82  See supra notes 77–81. 
83  See, e.g., MICHAEL HUNTER SCHWARTZ & DENISE RIEBE, CONTRACTS: A CONTEXT AND 
PRACTICE CASEBOOK 5 (2009) (“[P]redictability promotes our free market economy by 
providing certainty for those involved in exchanging goods and services. If a merchant 
knows the legal consequences of her negotiating efforts or of the language she selects for her 
contracts, she can act accordingly. This predictability encourages people to enter into con-
tracts, secure in the knowledge that those contracts will be enforced.”); Eric A. Posner, A 
Theory of Contract Law Under Conditions of Radical Judicial Error, 94 NW. U. L. REV. 749, 
751 (2000) (“Long-term contracts raise a straightforward, but seemingly intractable problem: 
in the long term events are so hard to predict, that parties will not be able to allocate future 
obligations and payments in a way that maximizes the value of their contract.”). 
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Surplus Policies 
In some states, coverage for landslides is available under stand-alone, 
named-peril landslide insurance policies, known as “difference-in-conditions” 
policies,84 which are sold by “surplus” line insurers.85 Landslide insurance can 
be purchased as a stand-alone coverage in states such as California,86 Oregon, 
Utah, and Washington.87 Because it is sold as a surplus-line policy primarily by 
Lloyd’s of London, however, many insurance agents are not even aware of its 
existence.88  
The cost for such insurance, which often covers only the damage to the 
contents of the house and not damage to the land (and sometimes not even the 
house itself), is high—approximately $1,000 a year for a $300,000 house with a 
84  See, e.g., Bronson, supra note 9; Graham Johnson, Standard Homeowners Insurance 
Doesn’t Cover Landslides, KIRO 7 (Mar. 26, 2014, 8:10 PM), http://www.kiro 
tv.com/news/news/standard-homeowners-insurance-doesnt-cover-landsli/nfMCq/ [https://per 
ma.cc/69QB-56PC]; Kyle Stokes, Are You Covered? Few Washington Homeowners Hold 
Insurance for Landslides, KPLU 88.5 (Mar. 25, 2014), http://www.kplu.org/post/are-you-
covered-few-washington-homeowners-hold-insurance-landslides [https://perma.cc/56Q3-5W 
G5]. 
85  See, e.g., KENNETH S. ABRAHAM, INSURANCE LAW AND REGULATION 780 (5th ed. 2010) 
(“[S]urplus line insurers . . . are not licensed, and are permitted to do business in the state 
only when a prospective purchaser is unable to obtain coverage from an insurer in the admit-
ted market.”). 
86  Notably, under earthquake policies sold by the California Earthquake Authority, landslide 
losses are expressly excluded from coverage unless the landslide was caused by an earth-
quake. See CAL. EARTHQUAKE AUTH., BASIC EARTHQUAKE POLICY–HOMEOWNERS § 5, at 13
(2012). Consequently, in California a homeowner needs to purchase separate policies to cov-
er landslide losses and earthquake losses in addition to purchasing a homeowners policy. 
87  Bronson, supra note 9; Landslide, Flood and Earthquake Available to Utahns, DAILY 
HERALD (Provo) (Aug. 6, 2008), http://www.heraldextra.com/news/local/landslide-flood-
and-earthquake-available-to-utahns/article_37d6a86b-1517-59f7-8121-b04bbd2640a7.html 
[https://perma.cc/D6Q7-M8FY]; Diane Wedner, Landslide Policy: Buy or Bypass?, L.A.
TIMES (June 12, 2005), http://articles.latimes.com/2005/jun/12/realestate/re-landslide12 
[https://perma.cc/X7R8-8PUQ]; “Snapp.com” Summary, SNAPP & SON INS., http://in 
surancearchieve.org/site/snapp.com/landslide+insurance [https://perma.cc/XU55-7R6V] (last 
visited July 10, 2016). An internet-based service owned and operated by a wholesale insur-
ance broker, Poultan Associates, Inc., known as the National Catastrophe Insurance Program 
(“NCIP”) sells stand-alone policies underwritten by Lloyd’s of London. According to the 
NCIP website, the policies cover earthquakes, landslides and floods. Frequently Asked Ques-
tions, CATCOVERAGE.COM, https://www.catcoverage.com/faq.aspx [https://perma.cc/J3F8-
ANBH] (follow “FAQ” hyperlink; select “About Us” tab) (last visited July 10, 2016). The 
sale of the policies and payment of premiums is all done through the internet. Id. The web-
site does not address the claims submission or payment process. Id. The policies can be pur-
chased for qualifying properties in most states. Frequently Asked Questions, 
CATCOVERAGE.COM, https://www.catcoverage.com/faq.aspx [https://perma.cc/J3F8-ANBH] 
(follow “FAQ” hyperlink; select “In which states can I get coverage?” tab) (last visited July 
10, 2016). 
88  See, e.g., Goldberg, supra note 37, at 124; Bronson, supra note 9. 
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deductible of 5 percent to 20 percent of the value of the property.89 Landslide 
policies also often exclude coverage for landslides caused by earthquakes.90 If a 
landslide previously has occurred in the area, then the homeowner will likely 
not be able to purchase landslide insurance to cover future landslide losses.91 
And, according to the Washington State Office of the Insurance Commissioner, 
if a house is located in a high risk area such as on “a hillside, coverage may be 
difficult to obtain.”92 Consequently, only about 4,700, or approximately 1 per-
cent of homes and businesses in the State of Washington have stand-alone 
landslide insurance due to high cost, lack of availability, and lack of infor-
mation regarding where to purchase it.93 Indeed, because so few landslide poli-
cies have been sold, there are no reported decisions arising from disputes be-
tween a policyholder and an insurer under a stand-alone landslide policy. 
In other places where landslides are also prevalent such as in Pittsburgh, 
Pennsylvania, even high-priced, stand-alone landslide policies are not available 
for purchase.94 Thus, despite being in one of the areas in the country with the 
highest risk for landslides, property owners in Pittsburgh, like homeowners in 
most parts of the country, are uninsured for naturally occurring landslide loss-
es.95 
89  See, e.g., Goldberg, supra note 37, at 124; Bhatt, supra note 40; Bronson, supra note 9; 
Stokes, supra note 84; Wedner, supra note 87. 
90  See Goldberg, supra note 37, at 124. 
91  Bhatt, supra note 40 (According to Sandi Esparza, a manager for the insurance broker 
Hub International Northwest, “If you live in an area known to have a high potential for land-
slides, you probably can’t get the insurance . . . [y]ou need to buy it before your area erodes 
and you need it[.]”). 
92  Landslide Insurance, WASH. STATE OFFICE OF THE INS. COMM’R, http://www.in 
surance.wa.gov/your-insurance/home-insurance/landslides/ [https://perma.cc/CJQ6-HRKM] 
(last visited June 17, 2014). 
93  See, e.g., Bronson, supra note 9; Johnson, supra note 40. 
94  In 2009, the Pennsylvania House of Representatives passed a bill that created a state-
sponsored insurance program to cover landslide losses. See H.R. 523, 2009 Gen. Assemb., 
Reg. Sess. (Pa. 2009). In sponsoring the bill, Representative Tony DeLuca noted that, “many 
people in western Pennsylvania have lost their homes to landslides because they did not have 
an opportunity to purchase insurance to protect their homes.” Pennsylvania House Approves 
Landslide Insurance Program, INS. & FIN. ADVISOR (Oct. 19, 2009), 
http://ifawebnews.com/2009/10/19/pennsylvania-house-approves-landslide-insurance-progra 
m/ [https://perma.cc/88WN-X96L]. In 2011, however, without a public explanation, the bill 
died in committee in Pennsylvania’s state senate. S.B. 597, 2011 Gen. Assemb., Reg. Sess. 
(Pa. 2011). 
95  In Steele v. Statesman Ins. Co., 607 A.2d 742, 743 (Pa. 1992), the Pennsylvania Supreme 
Court held that an “earth movement” exclusion only applied to naturally occurring land-
slides. The court has not yet considered, however, the newer language in the landslide exclu-
sion quoted in Part II.A that purports to also exclude coverage for landslides caused by hu-
man activities. And, of course, most landslides in Western Pennsylvania are naturally 
occurring so the Steele decision may be of limited value to homeowners today in Pennsylva-
nia. 
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III. POTENTIAL SOLUTIONS TO THE LANDSLIDE INSURANCE PROBLEM
The combination of the landslide exclusion in “all risk” homeowners and 
commercial-property policies and the limited availability of high-cost, stand-
alone policies has created a $3.5 billion uninsured landslide loss problem in 
America.96 This Part of the Article explains the need for more comprehensive 
landslide insurance coverage in America and then offers two potential solu-
tions: homeowners insurance and state-sponsored landslide insurance pro-
grams. 
A. The Necessity of Insurance
Insurance plays a socially and financially critical role in developed coun-
tries such as the United States. Insurance has even been described as a “social 
instrument” because of the important role it plays in protecting the limited as-
sets of individuals by transferring the risk of losses from individuals who can-
not financially afford to absorb the losses to a larger population through an in-
surer intermediary.97 Indeed, over two hundred years ago when this country 
was originally founded, people and businesses recognized the importance of 
insurance as a social safety net, as evidenced by their paying premiums to a 
“mutual” company or group to create a pool of money from which losses were 
paid.98 Essentially, the insurance company operated as a third-party administra-
tor that: (1) collected the premiums in order to create the pool of money from 
which losses could be paid; and (2) subsequently paid the losses of the mem-
bers of the group as such losses were incurred.99 
Homeowners insurance is even more important today than it was when the 
United States was first founded. Indeed, due to lending requirements, without 
homeowners insurance, homeownership is not even possible for most people.100 
96  U.S. GEOLOGICAL SURVEY, supra note 10. 
97  See, e.g., Jeffrey W. Stempel, The Insurance Policy as Social Instrument and Social Insti-
tution, 51 WM. & MARY L. REV. 1489, 1489 (2010); Deborah A. Stone, Beyond Moral Haz-
ard: Insurance as Moral Opportunity, 6 CONN. INS. L.J. 11, 26–29 (1999) (“Because virtual-
ly every adult citizen participates in various forms of mandatory insurance, from automobile 
liability insurance to unemployment insurance, old-age pensions and disability insurance, 
everyone is exposed to two of the moral assumptions of these programs: collective responsi-
bility for the well-being of individuals and individual responsibility for the well-being of 
others.”). 
98  See JAY M. FEINMAN, DELAY, DENY, DEFEND: WHY INSURANCE COMPANIES DON’T PAY 
CLAIMS AND WHAT YOU CAN DO ABOUT IT 21 (2010); JERRY & RICHMOND, supra note 16, at 
18; Christopher C. French, The Role of the Profit Imperative in Risk Management, 17 U. PA.
J. BUS. L. 1081, 1084–86 (2015) (arguing that the social purpose of insurance is being mar-
ginalized by private insurers’ pursuit of profits).
99  See FEINMAN, supra note 98, at 22–23; JERRY & RICHMOND, supra note 16, at 47–48 (not-
ing that mutual companies are not designed for profit, but instead to provide insurance to the 
members of the company). 
100  See CONSUMER FIN. PROT. BUREAU, supra note 20. 
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Anyone who needs to borrow money from a bank to purchase a house must 
purchase homeowners insurance because banks require such insurance as a pre-
requisite to issuing a mortgage.101  
As for-profit, publicly traded stock companies have come to dominate the 
insurance industry since the 1990s,102 insurers have attempted to improve their 
profitability by decreasing the coverage that is provided under insurance poli-
cies through the addition of numerous exclusions for some of the most common 
risks that property owners face.103 That trend should be reversed, and the exclu-
sion for landslide losses would be a great place to start. Homeowners insurance, 
as a social necessity today, should be required to cover losses caused by land-
slides. Indeed, catastrophic risks such as landslides are exactly the types of risk 
of loss that an “all risk” homeowners policy should cover. If people, business-
es, and communities are not covered by property insurance for the very types of 
losses that have the most devastating impacts on them, then the risk-
transferring and social safety net purposes of insurance cannot be fulfilled.104 
B. State Action to Remove the Landslide Exclusion from Policies
As discussed in Part II, the historical reasons for excluding coverage for
landslides under “all risk” homeowners policies—adverse selection, moral haz-
ard and correlated risks—are not valid. Consequently, states or the federal gov-
ernment should mandate that the landslide exclusion in homeowners policies be 
eliminated.105  
Albeit in an ad hoc manner, some state and federal legislatures have al-
ready begun attempting to force the insurance industry to fulfill the risk-
transferring and social safety net purposes of insurance by requiring insurers to 
provide products that cover some of the most common and devastating losses 
101  See MARTIN F. GRACE ET AL., CATASTROPHE INSURANCE: CONSUMER DEMAND, MARKETS
AND REGULATION 83 (2003) (discussing the demand for homeowners insurance, stating that 
“homeowners insurance . . . is essentially mandatory”); Stempel, supra note 97, at 1497. 
102  See Otgontsetseg Erhemjamts & J. Tyler Leverty, The Demise of the Mutual Organiza-
tional Form: An Investigation of the Life Insurance Industry, 42 J. MONEY, CREDIT &
BANKING 1011, 1011–12 (2010); French, supra note 98, at 1093. 
103  See French, supra note 98, at 1084–85. 
104  Id. at 1084. 
105  If homeowners’ insurance covered landslides, then another added benefit would be much 
less litigation following landslide events. As things currently stand, policyholders and their 
insurers spend countless dollars engaged in litigation whenever landslides occur. As dis-
cussed in Part II.C, when faced with a potentially uninsured catastrophic loss of their homes, 
policyholders often sue and then, in some states such as California and Washington, strain to 
find a covered cause of the loss that may have played a role in causing the landslide to es-
cape the landslide exclusion. And, because some courts are sympathetic to these concurrent 
causation arguments, policyholders are incentivized to sue. See cases cited supra note 80. If 
the landslide exclusion were eliminated, then such litigation also would be eliminated. 
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that Americans face.106 For health insurance, as an example, the Affordable 
Care Act prohibits insurers from: (1) refusing to insure certain people; (2) can-
celling insurance for people who become sick; and (3) using reverse adverse 
selection to charge people who fall under certain risk classifications prohibi-
tively expensive premiums.107 
In the area of auto insurance, some state legislatures have enacted statutes 
that eliminate certain policy exclusions or that require insurers to cover drivers 
whom insurers would refuse to cover if they were not statutorily required to do 
so.108 For example, drivers whom insurers refuse to insure because insurers do 
not consider them adequately profitable due to their risk profiles can still get a 
minimum amount of liability coverage in most states through assigned risk in-
surance pools.109 
In the property insurance context, many states have passed statutes that 
nullify the “innocent co-insured” exclusion.110 This exclusion prevents innocent 
co-insureds from recovering under policies for losses that were intentionally 
caused by another insured, such as when one spouse who is no longer living in 
the couple’s house destroys the house in order to prevent the spouse from hav-
ing it.111 By statutorily eliminating the exclusion, the innocent spouse can still 
recover under the policy. 
In sum, states and the federal government have the power, and they exer-
cise that power, to force insurers to cover risks the insurers would not volun-
tarily choose to cover when the consequences of not ensuring the risk are un-
derstood to be sufficiently important. Insuring landslides is another example of 
where states or the federal government should exercise their regulatory power 
over the insurance industry to require insurers to cover such losses under “all 
risk” homeowners insurance. 
C. State-Sponsored Landslide Insurance Programs
If there are lingering concerns that insurer insolvencies would occur if in-
surers were required to cover landslides notwithstanding the risk-reducing and 
risk-spreading mechanisms discussed in Part II.B.3, then states or the federal 
government could act as reinsurers for landslide losses that exceed a certain 
stated amount for any insurer. The United States federal government currently 
106  INT’L MONETARY FUND, Financial Sector Assessment Program Detailed Assessment of 
Observance on Insurance Core Principles, Country Report U.S. No. 15/90, at 21 (2015), 
https://www.treasury.gov/resource-center/international/Documents/cr1590.pdf [https://perm 
a.cc/LY8C-MFD5].
107  See generally ABRAHAM & SCHWARCZ, supra note 49, at 354–55. 
108  See, e.g., id. at 656–58. 
109  See, e.g., ABRAHAM, supra note 85, at 771. 
110  See, e.g., JERRY & RICHMOND, supra note 16, at 425–26. 
111  See, e.g., id. at 423–26. 
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acts as the reinsurer for terrorism losses.112 It could do so for landslide losses as 
well if global reinsurers were to refuse to sell reinsurance treaties to insurers 
that cover landslide losses in America. 
If “all risk” homeowners insurance were required to cover landslide losses, 
it is also conceivable that some private insurers would refuse to sell homeown-
ers insurance because they might conclude that such insurance would no longer 
be adequately profitable.113 If that unlikely scenario occurred and the currently 
robust market for homeowners insurance disappeared, then state-sponsored in-
surance programs could be created to fill the void. 
It could be argued that, under current law, state-sponsored insurance pro-
grams are better suited than private insurers to insure certain types of natural 
catastrophes in America for a number of reasons. First, tax laws effectively dis-
courage private insurers from accumulating capital to pay future losses because 
the income generated by insurers that could be set aside to pay future losses is 
taxed.114 Then, if that income is not distributed to shareholders, the income 
generated by the money (which could be used to pay future unrealized losses) 
is also taxed.115 Second, companies with accumulated surplus capital, which an 
insurer must have in order to cover the losses associated with natural catastro-
phes, are takeover targets for corporate raiders.116 Idle capital is something that 
corporate raiders generally believe can be redeployed for better uses.117 Third, 
insurers are not permitted under the current accounting rules to create reserves 
for the payment of future claims if the events giving rise to the losses and 
claims have not yet occurred.118 Thus, collectively these laws incentivize stock 
insurance companies to pay surplus earnings to shareholders in the form of div-
112  See Terrorism Risk Insurance Act of 2002, Pub. L. No. 107-297, § 110, 116 Stat. 2322 
(2002) (codified as amended in scattered sections of 15 U.S.C.); Michelle E. Boardman, 
Known Unknowns: The Illusion of Terrorism Insurance, 93 GEO. L.J. 783, 788–89 (2005). 
113  Also, despite the availability of reinsurance and catastrophe bonds, smaller insurers (par-
ticularly mutual companies) may not be adequately capitalized to cover natural catastrophes 
such as landslides. Unlike publicly traded stock companies, which can issue new shares, mu-
tual companies’ primary way of raising capital is by retaining surplus. See, e.g., Erhemjamts 
& Leverty, supra note 102, at 1011; Henry Hansmann, The Organization of Insurance Com-
panies: Mutual versus Stock, 1 J. L. ECON. & ORG. 125, 138 (1985); Dwight M. Jaffee & 
Thomas Russell, Catastrophe Insurance, Capital Markets, and Uninsurable Risks, 64 J. RISK
& INS. 205, 216–17 (1997); James A. Smallenberger, Restructuring Mutual Life Insurance 
Companies: A Practical Guide Through the Process, 49 DRAKE L. REV. 513, 518–19 (2001). 
Thus, in the absence of reinsurance and catastrophe bonds, small stock companies and mutu-
al companies may not be well suited to insure catastrophic risks such as landslides. 
114  See Cummins, supra note 17, at 371; Jaffee & Russell, supra note 113, at 212, 222. 
115  See Jaffee & Russell, supra note 113, at 212. 
116  See id. at 213. 
117  Id. 
118  See Cummins, supra note 17, at 371–72; Jaffee & Russell, supra note 113, at 209, 222 
(discussing Financial Accounting Standards Board (“FASB”) Statement No. 5 Accounting 
for Contingencies, which precludes an insurance company from earmarking capital surplus 
to pay for future catastrophic losses that have not yet occurred). 
86 NEVADA LAW JOURNAL [Vol. 17:63 
idends or stock repurchases so many insurers are not be adequately capitalized 
to cover natural catastrophes.119  
State-sponsored insurance programs, on the other hand, would not be sub-
ject to these laws so they would be well positioned to insure natural catastro-
phes. State-sponsored insurance programs would not be subject to sharehold-
ers’ demanding returns on their investments in the form of dividends or stock 
repurchases. Also, state-sponsored insurance programs would not be subject to 
the tax and accounting rules that discourage private companies from accumulat-
ing capital. Further, state-sponsored insurance programs would not be takeover 
targets for corporate raiders because such programs would not, of course, be 
available for purchase. Consequently, state-sponsored insurance programs 
could accumulate the capital needed to pay claims for large catastrophic losses 
caused by disasters without the need to distribute such capital to shareholders. 
In short, many of the legal impediments that private insurers currently must 
overcome in order to cover natural catastrophic risks such as landslides would 
not apply to state-sponsored insurance programs. 
Another potential advantage of state-sponsored insurance programs might 
be lower premiums than the rates currently charged by the few insurers that sell 
stand-alone landslide policies. Because private insurers aggressively compete 
for business in many lines of insurance such as homeowners insurance, a sig-
nificant portion of the premiums they collect is paid to insurance agents as sales 
commissions.120 Indeed, some reports indicate that as much as 20 percent of the 
premiums collected are paid to insurance agents as sales commissions.121 There 
would be no need to pay sales commissions to employees of a state-sponsored 
landslide insurance program because the program’s purpose would not be to 
make as much profit as possible for shareholders.  
Private insurers also currently spend significant amounts of money (gener-
ated by the premiums they collect) on advertising.122 Who has not seen the tele-
vision commercials in which All State features a beat up guy—“Mayhem”—
damaging peoples’ homes and vehicles while a deep voice counsels viewers to 
buy Allstate Insurance.123 Such TV ads and other marketing efforts cost the fif-
ty largest insurers approximately $2.5 billion annually;124 these costs naturally 
are passed on to customers in the form of higher premiums. These expenses 
could be avoided by a state-sponsored landslide insurance program. 
119  See Jaffee & Russell, supra note 113, at 212. 
120  See Thomas von Ungern-Sternberg, The Benefits of Introducing a Mandatory State Hur-
ricane Insurance Scheme in Florida 10 (Oct. 2009) (Working Papers in Econ.); see also Cas-
sandra R. Cole et al., The Use of Postloss Financing of Catastrophic Risk, 14 RISK MGMT. &
INS. REV. 265, 271 (2011). 
121  See von Ungern-Sternberg, supra note 120, at 10. 
122  See id. at 11. 
123  Mayhem is Everywhere, ALLSTATE, http://www.allstateonline.com/lp/mayhem [https:// 
perma.cc/VUW3-N7XJ] (last visited July 13, 2016). 
124  See FEINMAN, supra note 98, at 54. 
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After a person applies for insurance, insurers then spend significant 
amounts of money (again generated by the premiums they collect) during the 
underwriting process in an attempt to identify and eliminate the high-risk peo-
ple who are most likely to make claims—the “bad risks.”125 On the other hand, 
if state-sponsored programs accepted all of the 96 percent of homeowners who 
buy homeowners insurance,126 very little money would need to be spent on un-
derwriting efforts directed toward eliminating the highest risk policyholders 
from the pool of insureds because the full range of risk profiles, from high to 
low, would be included in the insurance pool. 
Theoretically, state-sponsored insurance programs also could result in re-
duced premium rates because such programs would not need to spend as much 
money investigating and litigating their policyholders’ claims, as the profit im-
perative currently mandates that private insurers do in order to maximize prof-
its for shareholders.127 Currently, insurers spend approximately 12 percent of 
their premium revenues investigating and litigating claims.128 Because there are 
no significant negative financial consequences for disputing claims, litigating 
claims makes good business sense for publicly traded insurance companies un-
der existing laws because every dollar (above and beyond their litigation costs) 
that insurers can avoid paying on claims increases insurers’ profitability.129 To 
the contrary, unless the policyholder can prove an insurer acted in bad faith, 
which is very difficult to do under current insurance law,130 an insurer that 
wrongfully denies its policyholder’s claim, delays payment of the claim, or un-
derpays the claim is liable only for the amount it should have paid plus a nomi-
125  See Bruggeman et al., supra note 17, at 217; Cole et al., supra note 120, at 271; von Un-
gern-Sternberg, supra note 120, at 13. 
126  See INS. INFO. INST., supra note 19. 
127  See Jaffee & Russell, supra note 113, at 213. 
128  See von Ungern-Sternberg, supra note 120, at 11. 
129  See FEINMAN, supra note 98, at 2, 5. Insurers’ aggressive claims investigation and pay-
ment practices do not hurt their bottom lines in the form of lost customers caused by gaining 
a reputation for unfair claims payment practices because the information regarding insurers 
claims payment practices is not disclosed to the public. Id. at 39–40. 
130  The standards for proving bad faith vary widely in jurisdictions throughout America. 
Some jurisdictions require that the policyholder prove that the insurer acted egregiously or 
with a dishonest intent, while others require the policyholder to prove that the insurer acted 
“unreasonably” with respect to the handling or payment of a claim and that the insurer knew 
or had reason to know that its behavior was unreasonable. See, e.g., JERRY & RICHMOND, su-
pra note 16, at 165–70 (explaining how the determination of bad faith often centers around 
the unreasonableness of the insurer’s conduct but varies across jurisdictions); Douglas R. 
Richmond, An Overview of Insurance Bad Faith Law and Litigation, 25 SETON HALL L.
REV. 74, 96–103 (1994) (discussing what constitutes bad faith and looking at various stand-
ards set forth by the courts). Many jurisdictions require that the insurer’s bad faith conduct 
be proven by the policyholder with “clear and convincing evidence.” See, e.g., JERRY &
RICHMOND, supra note 16, at 167 (explaining how some courts require the plaintiff to pro-
vide proof of bad faith by “clear and convincing evidence”). 
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nal interest award in today’s low interest rate environment.131 Thus, insurers are 
legally incentivized to: (1) pay as little as possible on claims regardless of the 
merits of the claims and (2) avoid paying claims for as long as possible because 
there are almost no legal consequences for doing so and insurers make a lot of 
money by holding and investing the money that is used to pay claims (known 
as the “float” in the insurance industry).132 That would not be the case for a 
state-sponsored landslide insurance program because it would not be governed 
by the profit imperative; instead, it would need only to verify the validity of a 
claim before paying it. 
Ideally, a state-sponsored program covering landslides would sell “all risk” 
policies that bundle the coverage for multiple perils together under a single pol-
icy. If state-sponsored property insurance programs covered only the peril of 
landslides, then adverse selection would be a concern. Only the people most 
likely to suffer landslides would purchase landslide policies. Consequently, be-
cause the pool of insureds would be relatively small, the premiums for such in-
surance necessarily would need to be high for the program to be actuarially 
sound. 
As discussed in Part II.D, high premiums are one of the problems with the 
landslide insurance currently sold by international surplus insurers. To make 
stand-alone landslide insurance affordable for most homeowners under state-
sponsored programs, such programs likely would need to subsidize the premi-
um rates. If actuarially sound premiums were not charged, however, then state-
sponsored landslide insurance programs could become insolvent like the feder-
al National Flood Insurance Program (“NFIP”) (a program that sells stand-
alone policies to cover flood losses at subsidized rates largely because actuari-
ally sound premium rates are not affordable for many homeowners).133 Thus, 
131  See, e.g., JERRY & RICHMOND, supra note 16, at 161 (explaining that bad faith remedies 
were created due to the “apparent inadequacy of contract remedies to compensate insureds 
and deter insurers from elevating their own interests above their insureds”). In order to actu-
ally be awarded a penalty such as punitive damages; however, in many jurisdictions the poli-
cyholder must prove by clear and convincing evidence that the insurer engaged in egregious, 
wanton misconduct. Id. at 167, 169. 
132  See, e.g., MARK R. GREENE, RISK AND INSURANCE 147 (4th ed. 1977) (“In property and 
liability insurance, investment income has accounted for a very substantial portion of total 
profits and has served to offset frequent underwriting losses.”); Eliot Martin Blake, Com-
ment, Rumors of Crisis: Considering the Insurance Crisis and Tort Reform in an Infor-
mation Vacuum, 37 EMORY L.J. 401, 422–23 (1988) (“Insurers do not simply hang onto 
premiums, of course; they invest them for the time period between payment of premiums 
and payment of losses. . . . The role of investment income in the [insurance] industry is par-
ticularly important. Studies have concluded that investment income allows the industry to 
remain profitable as a whole even with significant negative underwriting losses.”); see also 
FEINMAN, supra note 98, at 16; French, supra note 98, at 1120; Jeffrey W. Stempel, As-
sessing the Coverage Carnage: Asbestos Liability and Insurance After Three Decades of 
Dispute, 12 CONN. INS. L.J. 349, 357 n.18 (2006). 
133  See, e.g., Moving Ahead for Progress in the 21st Century Act, Pub. L. No. 112-141, 
§ 100248, 126 Stat. 405, 969 (2012) (amending 42 U.S.C. § 4001 et. seq.); see also Scales,
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although state-sponsored landslide insurance programs would have many ad-
vantages over private insurance, if the coverage were sold as stand-alone poli-
cies, then such programs could suffer from many of the same problems as the 
NFIP, such as insolvency and low participation rates.134 
D. Insurance for Landslide Losses in other Countries
In considering whether it is feasible for landslides to be covered under “all
risk” homeowners policies or state-sponsored programs, one can look to the 
ways in which other countries handle insurance for landslides. In numerous 
countries, landslide losses are mandatorily covered by private homeowners in-
surance, by a state-sponsored program, or by a combination of the two.135 New 
Zealand, France, Belgium, Norway, Romania, Switzerland, Iceland, and Aus-
tralia are eight examples to consider. 
In New Zealand, a government-sponsored insurance program covers land-
slide losses, along with other natural catastrophes.136 The insurance covers both 
land and structural damage.137 The premiums are not actuarially calculated.138 
Instead, the premium is based upon a percentage of the insured’s fire insurance 
premium regardless of the insured’s risk of a landslide loss because it is con-
                                                                                                                                 
supra note 17, at 16; U.S. GOV’T ACCOUNTABILITY OFFICE, GAO-14-364T, EXTREME
WEATHER EVENTS – LIMITING FEDERAL FISCAL EXPOSURE AND INCREASING THE NATION’S 
RESILIENCE 3 (2014) (statement of Mark Gaffigan, Managing Dir. Nat’l Res. and Env’t). See 
generally Homeowner Flood Insurance Affordability Act of 2014, Pub. L. No. 113-89, § 2, 
128 Stat. 1020 (codified as amended at 42 U.S.C. § 4014). 
134  See French, supra note 14, at 68–71; see also U.S. GOV’T ACCOUNTABILITY OFFICE,
GAO-14-127, FLOOD INSURANCE: STRATEGIES FOR INCREASING PRIVATE SECTOR 
INVOLVEMENT 2 (2014) (currently there are only 5.5 million NFIP policyholders); Rachel 
Lisotta, In Over Our Heads: The Inefficiencies of the National Flood Insurance Program 
and the Institution of Federal Tax Incentives, 10 LOY. MAR. L.J. 511, 518 (2012) (“[A] study 
in 2005 indicated 84 percent of residents in flood-prone areas had not purchased flood insur-
ance . . .”) (internal quotations omitted); Quynh T. Pham, The Future of the National Flood 
Insurance Program in the Aftermath of Hurricane Katrina, 12 CONN. INS. L.J. 629, 652 
(2006) (As of 2006, “of the estimated 72 million owner-occupied structures, only 4.7 million 
property-owners purchased flood insurance through the NFIP.”); Susan Stellin, Reconsider-
ing Flood Insurance, N.Y. TIMES (Nov. 8, 2012), http://www.nytimes.com/2012/11/11/real 
estate/reconsidering-flood-insurance-after-hurrican-sandy.html?_r=0 [https://perma.cc/J2FG-
WHPK] (estimating that approximately 18 percent of homeowners in flood-prone areas na-
tionwide have flood insurance). 
135  Letter from Orice M. Williams, Dir., Fin. Mkts. and Cmty. Inv., to the Hon. Spencer 
Bachus et al., Comm. on Fin. Servs. 3 (Dec. 22, 2008) (GAO-09-188R – Natural Hazard 
Mitigation and Insurance). 
136  See Earthquake and War Damage Act 1944, 8 GEO. VI, NO. 15 (N.Z.); Robert B. Olshan-
sky & J. David Rogers, Unstable Ground: Landslide Policy in the United States, 13 
ECOLOGY L.Q. 939, 989 (1987); Risley, supra note 10, at 1169. 
137  See Risley, supra note 10, at 1169. 
138  Id. at 1170. 
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sidered too difficult and costly to attempt to create actuarially sound premiums 
regarding specific policyholders’ risks of landslide losses.139 
In France, homeowners insurance must cover natural disasters, including 
landslides.140 The premium for such coverage is a fixed amount.141 There is also 
a premium discount if the municipality in which the property is located has 
adopted a “prevention of risk plan.”142 A state-sponsored program known as the 
Caisse Centrale de Reassurance (“CCR”), provides reinsurance to the insurers 
and receives 50 percent of the premiums collected by the insurers and likewise 
pays 50 percent of any losses.143 France provides an unlimited guarantee of the 
CCR.144 
In Belgium, it also is mandatory that homeowners insurance cover natural 
catastrophes, including landslides.145 Unlike the French system, however, the 
insurers can adjust the premiums based upon the risk of loss presented by indi-
vidual policyholders.146 Approximately 50 percent of the insurers nonetheless 
charge the same premium to all of their policyholders.147 Each individual insur-
er’s risk of losses has a limit, and a state-sponsored “Disaster Fund” covers any 
losses above the insurer’s limit.148 
Likewise, in Norway, it is mandatory that homeowners insurance cover 
natural catastrophes, including landslides.149 The aggregate limit of liability for 
insurers for any natural disaster event is established by the King.150 If a victim 
of a natural catastrophe does not have insurance, then a state-sponsored pro-
gram—the National Fund for Natural Damage Assistance—covers the loss.151  
In Romania, purchasing homeowners insurance to cover landslide losses, 
along with earthquakes and floods, is mandatory.152 Legislation was passed in 
2008 to establish an Insurance Pool Against Natural Disasters (“PAID”), which 
139  Id. 
140  See, e.g., Michael Faure & Véronique Bruggeman, Catastrophic Risks and First-Party 
Insurance, 15 CONN. INS. L.J. 1, 43 (2008); Olivier Moréteau, Policing the Compensation of 
Victims of Catastrophes: Combining Solidarity and Self-Responsibility, 54 LOY. L. REV. 65, 
86 (2008). 
141  See Faure & Bruggeman, supra note 140, at 44. 
142  Id. 
143  Id. at 45; Moréteau, supra note 140, at 89. 
144  See Faure & Bruggeman, supra note 140, at 45; Moréteau, supra note 140, at 90. 
145  See Faure & Bruggeman, supra note 140, at 45–46. 
146  See id. at 46. 
147  Id. 
148  Id. 
149  See Rules for Norwegian Natural Perils Pool, Act No. 70, § 1 (21 Dec. 1979) (Nor.). 
150  See Act on Natural Damage Insurance, Act No. 69, § 3 (16 June 1989) (Nor.). 
151  ORG. FOR ECON. CO-OPERATION & DEV., FINANCIAL MANAGEMENT OF LARGE-SCALE 
CATASTROPHES 86–87 (2008). 
152  Ingrid–Mihaela Dragotă et al., Compulsory Insurance for Dwellings in Romania Between 
Mitigating the Impacts of Natural Disasters and Giving Rise to Social Inequities, 6 AFR. J.
BUS. MGMT. 177, 177 (2012). 
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is an association comprised of thirteen insurance companies that offer home-
owners insurance.153 Two separate categories of dwellings were established un-
der the Natural Disaster Insurance Policy.154 Premiums are determined based on 
the building materials of the dwelling.155 A dwelling is a Type A building if it is 
a “building with strength structure of reinforced concrete, metal or wood or 
with exterior walls made of stone, burnt brick or any materials resulting from 
heat or chemical treatment.”156 A dwelling identified as a Type B building is a 
“building with exterior walls of brick or any other material not subject to heat 
or chemical treatment.”157 Mandatory insurance for landslides covers only 
damage to the dwelling.158 Any coverage for personal property must be ob-
tained by purchasing additional voluntary insurance.159 
In Switzerland, insurance companies that provide fire insurance must in-
clude coverage for natural catastrophes, including landslides.160 It is mandatory 
for homeowners to purchase fire insurance; therefore, all homeowners have 
coverage for landslides.161 The way individuals acquire this insurance, howev-
er, varies among the twenty-six cantons.162 Insurance is offered by private in-
surance companies in seven of the cantons: Geneva, Uri, Schwyz, Ticino, Ap-
penzell Inner Rhodes, Valais, and Obwalden.163 These private insurance 
companies have formed the Natural Perils Pool.164 Cantonal building insurance 
companies, institutions governed by public law that hold a monopoly in their 
respective cantons, provide insurance for the other nineteen cantons.165 Premi-
ums are provided at a uniform rate determined by the Federal Office of Private 
Insurance (“FOPI”).166 
In Iceland, under the Iceland Catastrophe Insurance Act of 1975, landslide 
insurance is included under fire insurance policies, which are mandatory for all 
153  Mădălina Giorgiana Mangra et al., Households Insurance – How to Release Catastrophic 
Risks, 39 ANNALS U. CRAIOVA ECON. SCI. 174, 175 (2011). 
154  Id. 
155  Id. 
156  Id. 
157  Id. 
158  Id. at 178. 
159  Id. 
160  U.S. GOV’T ACCOUNTABILITY OFFICE, GAO-05-199, CATASTROPHE RISK: U.S. AND 
EUROPEAN APPROACHES TO INSURE NATURAL CATASTROPHE AND TERRORISM RISKS 36 
(2005). 
161  ORG. FOR ECON. CO-OPERATION & DEV., supra note 151, at 94. 
162  Id. 
163  Id. 
164  Id. 
165  Id. at 94–95. 
166  Special Requirements for Insurance Class B8: “Fire and Natural Forces”, SWISS FED.
DEP’T FIN. (Jan. 1, 2006), https://www.finma.ch/FinmaArchiv/bpv/download/e/Spez_Merk 
blatt_ES_E.pdf [https://perma.cc/4RES-HMN4]. 
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homeowners.167 Only direct physical losses are covered, and the policy will not 
ensure a structure that was built in violation of regulations and therefore is 
more vulnerable to damage by natural perils.168 The Iceland Catastrophe Insur-
ance Act also established Iceland Catastrophe Insurance (“ICI”), a state-owned 
corporation, which provides landslide and other natural perils insurance.169 Pri-
vate insurers that provide fire insurance collect premiums, and then those pre-
miums are provided to ICI in exchange for a collection fee.170 Premium rates do 
not vary by risk, but instead are set at 0.025 percent of the property’s value.171 
Reinsurance for ICI is available on the global market, but ICI has not had to ac-
cess any of its reinsurance for any natural disaster since its creation.172 
In Australia, landslide insurance can be purchased from private insurance 
companies on a voluntary basis.173 Many standard homeowners insurance poli-
cies that cover natural disasters exclude coverage, however, for landslides ex-
cept in limited circumstances.174 Specifically, landslides are covered only when 
they occur as a result of another insured event such as an earthquake.175 The 
Australian government does provide, however, partial reimbursement for State 
and Territory natural-disaster relief for landslides under the Natural Disaster 
Relief and Recover Arrangements (“NDRRA”).176 “[P]ersonal hardship and 
distress” relief provided under the NDRRA can include grants for things such 
as housing repairs.177 The Australian government also provides direct support 
167  ORG. FOR ECON. CO-OPERATION & DEV., supra note 151, at 69. 
168  Id. 
169  Id. 
170  Id. 
171  Id. 
172  Id. at 70. 
173  Id. at 44. Other countries such as Sweden, Germany, and Italy provide landslide insur-
ance through voluntary private insurance. In Sweden, landslide coverage is provided by pri-
vate insurers under homeowners insurance. See, e.g., SWEDEN FACING CLIMATE CHANGE –
THREATS AND OPPORTUNITIES SOU 2007:60, SWEDISH COMM’N ON CLIMATE AND
VULNERABILITY 593 (2007). Similarly, in Germany, landslide insurance has been provided 
on a voluntary basis since the Federal Insurance Supervisory Office approved the coverage 
in 1991. ORG. FOR ECON. CO-OPERATION & DEV., supra note 151, at 65. Landslide insurance 
is provided either as a supplement to building insurance or as a separate policy. Id. Likewise, 
landslide insurance in Italy is not mandated, but it is offered by private insurance companies. 
Id. at 72; see also id. at 67, 74 (noting there have been failed attempts in Germany and Italy 
to mandatorily require that landslide losses be covered by insurance). 
174  See ORG. FOR ECON. CO-OPERATION & DEV., supra note 151, at 44. 
175  See COMMONWEALTH OF AUSTL., NATURAL DISASTER INSURANCE REVIEW: INQUIRY INTO 
FLOOD INSURANCE AND RELATED MATTERS 33 (2011). 
176  ORG. FOR ECON. CO-OPERATION & DEV., supra note 151, at 43. 
177  NEIL WEEKS, AUSTRALIAN REINSURANCE POOL CORP., FINANCIAL MANAGEMENT OF
CATASTROPHES IN AUSTRALIA 6, https://www.oecd.org/finance/insurance/38120102.pdf [http 
s://perma.cc/E4JZ-4RDM] (last visited July 23, 2016). 
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to individuals affected by a natural disaster through Australian Government 
Disaster Recovery Arrangements (“AGDRA”).178 
In sum, if it is feasible for landslide losses to be covered by homeowners 
insurance or state-sponsored programs in numerous countries throughout the 
world, then one can conclude that they also could be covered in the United 
States. 
E. Resistance Points
Insurers likely will resist any mandate that requires them to cover land-
slides under “all risk” homeowners insurance. Insurers will likely argue that a 
mandate requiring such coverage would be inconsistent with: (1) the concept of 
freedom of contract179 with its attendant notion that insurers should be free to 
decide what their policies will or will not cover; and (2) the unprofitability of 
insuring landslide losses due to adverse selection, moral hazard, and correlated 
risk concerns. Such arguments have carried the day for more than a century.180 
Although such arguments should no longer have any force for the reasons dis-
cussed in this Article, the insurance industry’s lobby is strong, as evidenced by 
the fact that insurance regulators repeatedly have approved policy forms that 
contain the landslide exclusion (and numerous other exclusions) for decades.181 
Insurers can also be expected to argue that they would not be permitted to 
charge actuarially sound premiums for policies that are required to cover land-
slide losses. Insurers made the same argument when they were not allowed to 
stop selling homeowners policies that covered wind damage caused by hurri-
canes in coastal states after multiple hurricanes came ashore in the United 
States a decade ago.182 To be clear, this Article does not propose that insurers 
be forced to provide landslide coverage for free under “all risk” homeowners 
insurance. To the contrary, insurers should be allowed to charge a higher pre-
mium to reflect the fact that the policies are now insuring an additional risk. 
178  Id. at 7. 
179  This argument ignores, of course, the fact that insurance policies are contracts of adhe-
sion sold on a take it or leave it basis in which the policyholder has no input regarding the 
language contained in the policy. See sources cited supra note 51. 
180  See sources cited supra note 48. 
181  See sample forms supra note 49–50. 
182  See Donald T. Hornstein, Natural Disasters and the Financing of Fat Tails: Lessons from 
the Economics and Political Economy of Weather-Related Insurance 4 n.9 (Univ. of N.C. 
Legal Studies Research Paper No. 2249904, 2013), http://ssrn.com/abstract=2249904 
[https://perma.cc/7WBP-688P]  (describing Allstate’s, Farmers Insurance’s and Farm Bu-
reau’s withdrawal from the insurance markets in Florida and North Carolina when they did 
not obtain regulatory approval for their requested premium rate increases despite the fact that 
premium rates already had been increased by 77 percent in Florida between 2001 and 2006); 
Elisabeth A. Ondera, Testing the Waters: The South Carolina Coastal Captive Insurance Act 
as Part of a Multifaceted Approach to the Coastal Insurance Conundrum, 59 S.C. L. REV. 
599, 600–01 (2008). 
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However, the additional risk assumed by insurers would be spread across ap-
proximately sixty-nine million homeowners/policyholders with a wide range of 
risk profiles instead of just a few thousand high-risk stand-alone landslide in-
surance customers,183 so the average premium increase for each policyholder 
should be quite modest.184 
One should also expect political opposition from some quarters to any 
mandate requiring private insurers to cover landslide losses under “all risk” 
homeowners insurance or to the creation of state-sponsored insurance pro-
grams. Some people might characterize a requirement that homeowners poli-
cies cover landslide losses or the creation of state-sponsored insurance pro-
grams to cover such risks, in combination with the existing laws that effectively 
require homeowners to purchase homeowners insurance,185 as a form of social-
ism. 
The reality, of course, is that the insurance industry already is highly regu-
lated.186 Public policy and social concerns regarding the protection of powerless 
consumers and the compensation of innocent victims are significant drivers of 
the law for some lines of insurance such as auto and health. Insurers already are 
regulated by states with respect to the policy language contained in their policy 
forms, the premium rates they can charge, and the amounts of capital surplus 
they must maintain.187 In addition, states already have created and managed 
guarantee associations to cover claims submitted to insolvent insurers, and 
states already have insurance programs for auto drivers who private insurers 
refuse to accept as customers.188 Thus, eliminating the landslide exclusion from 
homeowners policies or creating state-sponsored insurance programs to cover 
183  See supra Part II.D. 
184  In a perfect world, to accomplish the broadest spreading of the risk of landslide losses, 
nationwide premium rates would be charged with only a modestly higher premium rate be-
ing charged to high risk properties (as opposed to attempting to use actuarially based rates on 
an individual home by home basis) similar to the way the Affordable Care Act allows only 
limited premium variation based upon factors such as the insured’s age and smoking history. 
See ABRAHAM & SCHWARCZ, supra note 49, at 354. Homeowners insurance, however, is cur-
rently sold, priced and regulated on a state-by-state basis. Consequently, unless that were to 
change, greater premium subsidization by lower risk homeowners in states where some areas 
are at higher risks of landslides, such as the West Coast states, necessarily would occur be-
cause the risk of landslide losses would be spread directly only to other homeowners in such 
states. Insurers, however, could still spread their own risks of loss to entities outside of such 
states through the insurers’ corporate relationships with other insurers, reinsurance and catas-
trophe bonds. See supra Part II.B.3. 
185  See INS. INFO. INST., supra note 19. 
186  Scales, supra note 17, at 18. 
187  See ABRAHAM & SCHWARCZ, supra note 49, at 126–28, 142–46; JERRY & RICHMOND, 
supra note 16, at 90–94. 
188  See ABRAHAM & SCHWARCZ, supra note 49, at 122–23; ABRAHAM, supra note 85, at 771; 
see also Spencer L. Kimball & Noreen J. Parrett, Creation of the Guaranty Association Sys-
tem, 19 J. INS. REG. 259, 259–60 (2000). 
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landslide losses would be simply one of many ways in which states can and do 
regulate the insurance industry.  
Other people who stress individualism over community likely will object to 
including mandatory coverage for landslides under homeowners insurance or 
creating state-sponsored insurance programs if it results in any amount of pre-
mium subsidization.189 Under the proposals in this Article, it is possible that 
people who live in extremely low-risk areas would subsidize those who live in 
high-risk areas because not all of the numerous potential risk classifications for 
the peril of landslide would be factored into the premiums for the higher-risk 
homes.190 Addressing all of the potential risk variables for landslide risk would 
be unnecessary if coverage for landslides were bundled together with all of the 
other covered perils, however. Each policyholder’s premium would be based 
upon her home’s overall risk profile for all covered perils, not just with respect 
to any particular peril. In such circumstances, because the premium calculation 
would be based upon a broad array of factors, it is inevitable that some premi-
um subsidization would occur. Such a scenario would not, however, be any dif-
ferent from how insurance operates today. Coverage for many risks are already 
provided under homeowners policies regardless of whether the policyholder 
actually needs or wants coverage for all of the covered risks. Therefore, policy-
holders already are paying for coverage they do not want or need, thus subsi-
dizing other policyholders in the same pool of insureds who do want and need 
that coverage. That, in fact, is one of the very reasons why landslide coverage 
should be included in “all risk” homeowners policies. Bundling coverage for 
landslides with other perils would make insurance for landslide losses more af-
fordable and would dramatically increase participation rates.  
189  With respect to another natural catastrophic risk, flooding, many people probably do not 
realize that they are subsidizing flood losses even though they do not have flood insurance. 
The NFIP, which is sold as stand-alone named peril insurance for just flood losses, currently 
is being subsidized by taxpayers in the amount of approximately $24 billion even though 
most people are uninsured for flood losses. See U.S. GOV’T ACCOUNTABILITY OFFICE, supra 
note 133. Further, government bailouts of property owners in areas devastated by natural 
catastrophes such as Hurricanes Katrina and Sandy are another form of public subsidization 
of individuals’ losses. 
190  An example of a state where lower risk homeowners currently subsidize higher risk 
homeowners insurance premium rates for certain catastrophic perils is Florida. The dominant 
homeowners insurance provider in Florida is Citizens Property Insurance Corporation, a 
state-sponsored program. Cole et al., supra note 120, at 269. It offers property insurance to 
homeowners in Florida to cover hurricane damage at premium rates significantly lower than 
private insurers. Id. It is able to do so because: (1) it does not need to provide an adequate 
return to investors; (2) it is tax exempt; (3) it does not need to raise excessive amounts of 
capital to pre-fund losses because it has the ability to do post-loss assessments; and (4) it is 
reinsured by a state-sponsored reinsurer, the Florida Hurricane Catastrophe Fund. See id. at 
267–71. Under the program, the premium rates charged to coastal residents are subsidized by 
inland residents to a minor extent. Id. at 280–85. 
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CONCLUSION 
 Despite the fact that landslides account for approximately $3.5 billion in 
damage annually, only a few American homeowners in a few states have insur-
ance that covers landslide losses. The landslide insurance coverage that is 
available is very expensive and often does not even cover a significant amount 
of the loss a typical landslide victim suffers. That is not the case in many coun-
tries around the world, which have recognized that the justifications historically 
used to allow insurers to exclude coverage for natural catastrophes such as 
landslides—adverse selection, moral hazard, and correlated risks—have little 
force today.  
Unlike other types of catastrophes that cause widespread damage to hun-
dreds or thousands of people at the same time, landslides typically impact a 
much smaller geographic area and number of people when they occur, so the 
argument that landslide losses are uninsurable, correlated risks is untenable. In 
addition, insurance is now a global business by which the risk of loss for any 
individual or group of policyholders in any given geographic area is spread 
across a worldwide pool of premium-paying insureds and investors through re-
insurance and catastrophe bonds. Consequently, homeowners insurance could 
cover landslides with little risk of insurer insolvencies occurring as a result. Al-
ternatively, or in combination with private insurance, state-sponsored insurance 
programs could be created so landslides cease to be uninsured catastrophes in 
America. 
